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Abstract – The electoral cycle literature has developed 
in two clearly distinct phases. The first one considered 
the existence of non-rational (naive) voters whereas 
the second one considered fully rational voters. It is 
our view that an intermediate approach is more 
appropriate, i.e. one that considers learning voters, 
which are boundedly rational. In this sense, one may 
consider perceptrons as learning mechanisms used by 
voters to perform a classification of the incumbent in 
order to distinguish opportunistic (electorally 
motivated) from benevolent (non-electorally 
motivated) behaviour of the government. The paper 
explores precisely the problem of how to classify a 
government showing in which, if so, circumstances a 
perceptron can resolve that problem. This is done by 
considering a model recently considered in the 
literature, i.e. one allowing for output persistence, 
which is a feature of aggregate supply that, indeed, 
may turn impossible to correctly classify the 
government. 
Keywords ‐  Classification, Elections, Government, 
Output Persistence, Perceptrons. 
1. Introduction 
An electoral cycle created by governments is a 
phenomenon that seems to characterise, at least in 
some particular occasions and/or circumstances, the 
democratic economies. As it is generally accepted, 
the short-run electorally-induced fluctuations 
prejudice the long-run welfare. Since the very first 
studies on the matter, some authors offered 
suggestions as to what should be done against this 
electorally-induced instability. For some authors, 
ever since the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1975), a 
good alternative to the obvious proposal to increase 
the electoral period length is to consider that voters 
abandon a passive and naive behaviour and, instead, 
are willing to learn about government’s intentions. 
The electoral cycle literature has developed in two 
clearly distinct phases. The first one, which took 
place in the mid-1970s, considered the existence of 
non-rational (naive) voters. In accordance with the 
rational expectations revolution, in the late 1980s 
the second phase of models considered fully 
rational voters. It is our view that an intermediate 
approach is more appropriate, i.e. one that 
considers learning voters, which are boundedly 
rational. In this sense, one may consider 
perceptrons as learning mechanisms used by voters 
to perform a classification of the incumbent in 
order to distinguish opportunistic (electorally 
motivated) from benevolent (non-electorally 
motivated) behaviour of the government. The main 
objective of this paper consists precisely on 
studying the problem of how to classify a 
government showing in which, if so, circumstances 
a perceptron, can resolve that problem. To achieve 
this objective we will consider a recent version of a 
stylised model of economic policy, i.e. a version 
based on an aggregate supply curve embodying 
output persistence. See Gärtner 
(1996,1997,1999,2000) and/or Caleiro (2009,2012). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 offers the analysis of the bounded 
rationality approach as a motivation for the use of 
perceptrons as learning devices. Section 3 then 
presents the characteristics of the perceptron, which 
will be used to perform the classification of the 
government task. Section 4 explores the problem of 
how to classify a government showing in which, if 
so, circumstances the perceptron can resolve that 
problem. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Bounded Rationality 
Approach 
Generally speaking, learning models have been 
developed as a reasonable alternative to the 
unrealistic informational assumption of rational 
expectations models. Moreover, through learning 
models it is possible to study the dynamics of 







rational expectations models, is ignored. Although 
a number of different studies modelling learning 
have been presented, two main classes of models 
can be distinguished: rational learning and 
boundedly rational learning models. 1  In rational 
learning models, it is assumed that agents know the 
true structural form of the model generating the 
economy, but not some of the parameters of that 
model. In boundedly rational learning models, it is 
assumed that agents, while learning is taking place, 
use a ‘reasonable’ rule, e.g., by considering the 
reduced form of the model. 
Salmon (1995) is, to the best of our knowledge, one 
of the very few references where an innovative 
bounded rationality approach such as neural 
networks learning has been applied in a policy-
making problem. We propose to use this approach 
within a political business cycles context (see also 
Caleiro, 2013). That being said, we will consider 
that bounded rationality voters have to classify 
economic policies and outcomes as coming from 
opportunistic or from benevolent government 
behaviour. 
3. The Methodology of Perceptrons 
Given the characteristics of perceptrons it, thus, 
seems appropriate to consider that the above 
mentioned classification task can be performed 
under this formulation of bounded rationality 
agents. Given that (artificial) neural networks are 
simulations of how biological neurons are supposed 
to work, the structure of human brains, where 
processing units, the so-called neurons, are 
connected by sinapses, is approximated by 
(artificial) neural networks. In our case, a single-
layer linear classifier, known as perceptron, will be 
used to perform the classification task or, in other 
words, will be used to determine the vector of 
weights and bias specifying a line on the space 
output-inflation such that two sub-sets of points – 
obviously the opportunistic and benevolent ones – 
are defined. 
4. The Classification of the 
Government 
                                                            
1  Westaway (1992) prefers to distinguish closed-loop 
learning, where agents learn about the parameters of the 
decision rule, from open-loop learning, where agents 
form an expectation of the path for a particular variable 
which they sequentially update. As is pointed out, 
closed-loop learning will be virtually identical to the 
parameter updating scheme using Kalman filtering. 
In the electoral business cycle literature, one of the 
most crucial conclusions is that the short-run 
electorally-induced fluctuations prejudice the long-
run welfare. In fact, because the electoral results 
depend on voters’ evaluation, we can consider that, 
if electoral business cycles do exist, it is because 
voters, through ignorance or for some other reason, 
allow them to exist. This point introduces a well-
known problem of electorally-induced behaviour 
punishment and its related problem of monitoring. 
In reality, voters often cannot truly judge/classify if 
an observed state/policy is the result of a self-
interested/opportunistic government or, on the 
contrary, results as a social-planner/benevolent 
outcome, simply because voters do not know the 
structure, the model or the transmission mechanism 
connecting policy values to state values.  
Even so, voters do ‘anticipate’ the possible 
economic damage resulting from such myopic 
behaviour by governments and, especially closer to 
the elections, start to classify policies and outcomes 
as potentially being the result of an ‘electoralist’ 
strategy. This is done in order not to be ‘fooled’ by 
the incumbent government or simply to punish the 
incumbent government in case of clear signals of 
electorally-induced policies. In other words, a 
classification is made, so that for a sufficiently 
small sub-set of policies classified as ‘electoralist’, 
voters usually do not take that as a serious motive 
for punishment, but others, regarded as serious 
deviations, are punished. Note the difference between 
this approach and the one considered, for instance, in 
Minford (1995). Here, it is assumed that “voters 
penalise absolutely any evidence that monetary 
policy has responded to anything other than news”, 
by ‘absolutely’ meaning that there is enough 
withdrawal of voters to ensure electoral defeat. In 
general, this classification task is made difficult by 
ignorance of the structural form of the model 
transforming policies in outcomes and also simply 
because information gathering costs money and 
time. 
4.1. The model  
Recently some authors have assumed an extended 
version of the standard aggregate supply curve 
 ettt yy   , where ty  denotes the 
level of output (measured in logarithms) that 
deviates from the natural level, y , whenever the 
inflation rate, t , deviates from its expected level 
e
t , by considering  
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   etttt yyy   11 , (1) 
where   measures the degree of output 
persistence. See Gärtner (1999) for an output 
persistence case and/or Jonsson (1997) for an 
unemployment persistence case. As acknowledged 
in Gärtner (1999), only at that time authors have 
started to pay due attention to the consequences of 
considering that relevant macroeconomic variables, 
in reality, show some degree of persistence over 
time. In fact, a casual observation on reality shows 
that Europe has been facing a problem in what 
concerns unemployment which indeed reflects 
persistence. Given the close connection between 
unemployment and output, it should be possible to 
‘translate’ our results in terms of output to results 
in terms of unemployment. 
When normalizing the natural level of output such 
that 0y  the aggregate supply curve reduces to: 
 etttt yy   1 , (2) 




t  , (3) 
where 10    and 10   . 
As said before, a most common kind of linear 
classifiers for classification purposes is the so-
called perceptron. In order to perform the task of 
classifying the government, in what concerns its 
behaviour during the mandate, it is required the 
determination of the opportunistic and benevolent 
solutions. These solutions differ in accordance with 
the way time periods are discounted: whereas for 
society, therefore also for a benevolent 
government, future periods should be less 
important than present ones, this is not the case 
with an opportunistic government, as future 
moments, i.e. those closer to the election day, are 
more vital than present ones, in order to explore the 
decay in the memory of voters. 
Having said that, concerning the government's 
objective function, we make the standard 
assumption that the incumbent faces a mandate 
divided into two periods, t =1,2, such that society’s 
welfare during the mandate, i.e. the benevolent 
government's objective function is given by: 
21 UUU  , (4) 
where   is the social rate of discount, whereas 
opportunistic government's objective function is : 
21 VVV   , (5) 
where   is the degree of memory of the 
electorate. In (4) and (5) we also admit that  





In these circumstances it is worth immediately 
noticing that, in general, excepting if 1 , the 
policies that maximise social welfare (4) are not the 
ones that maximise popularity (5). As it plausible 
to assume that both   and   do not exceed 1, it 
is immediately clear that only in the case of perfect 
memory, i.e. ,1  and both periods being 
equally important for society, i.e. ,1  an 
opportunistic government will behave exactly as a 
benevolent one. This fact allows for making it 
plausible to ask the question: how to classify a 
government?, whose answer is supposed to be 
given by a perceptron when separating optimal 
outcomes into two parts: the opportunistic and the 
benevolent ones. In other words, the opportunistic 
and benevolent solutions (policies and outcomes) 
will constitute the necessary inputs for the 
perceptron application. Given the classification task 
format, let us precisely define what will be called 
opportunistic or ‘electoralist’ inputs, that is 
policies, and opportunistic outputs, that is 
outcomes, to be compared with benevolent inputs 
and benevolent outputs. 
Clearly, the opportunistic policy and outcomes will 
be, respectively, the values of inflation and output 
which result from the maximisation of (4) and (5) 
subject to (2) and (3). This immediately leads to the 
optimal policies:2 
    11B , (7) 












 O2 . (10) 
Those policies lead to the optimal output levels:  
                                                            
2  From this point onwards, the superscripts B and O 
identify an element as, respectively, concerning the 
benevolent and the opportunistic government. 
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   001 1   yy B , (11) 




















































 11 002 yy
O
. (14) 
Before proceeding with the classification task, it is 
relevant to note that there are, in fact, two possible 
patterns for the political business cycle: i) a typical 
one, where inflationary expansions take place 
immediately before the elections and ii) an atypical 
one, where the inflationary expansions take place 
immediately after the elections.3 Given that: 
   BB 12 , 

  OO 12
, 
the typical pattern will be observed when    
and the atypical one when   . Plainly, when 
   there will be no cycle at all. 
Given the optimal solutions, (7) to (14), it is 


















the typical pattern will then be characterised by 
BB
12   , 
OO
12   , 
OB
11   , 
OB
22    
and OB yy 11  , 
OB yy 22  , whereas the atypical 
pattern will be characterised by BB 12   , 
                                                            
3 This means that, in general, not possible to always use 
the observed pre-elections expansions as empirical 
evidence supporting the existence of an opportunistic 
behaviour of the government as, in fact, even some 
experienced scholars incorrectly do. 
OO
12   , 
OB
11   , 
OB
22    and 
OB yy 11  , 
OB yy 22  . 
Given that, in the previous mandate, no matter the 
kind of government,  0  it is possible to 
further simplify the optimal output levels 
expressions, (11) to (14), to:  
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    1201 yy B , (15) 
  222022 12  yy B , (16) 






























4.2. The classification task 
The optimal inflation rates, (7) to (10), and output 
levels, (15) to (18), define the coordinates of four 
points in the  ,y  space. This space is to be 
partioned, if possible, in two sub-spaces by a linear 
decision boundary – in that consists the classification 
task – by the perceptron. See figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – The perceptron classification 
Figure 1 allows visualising the opportunistic and 
benevolent trajectories in the inflation-output, (y,), 
space, showing an example where the classification of 
the government is possible to be achieved by the 
perceptron. 
There are, therefore, four points located in the (y,) 
space, two of each type, O and B. This makes possible 
to draw two line segments connecting the two points 
of each kind. If these two line segments cross, it is 
impossible to obtain a decision boundary. This can be 
checked by a system of equations involving two 
convex combinations between these points defining 
the intersection between the straight line segments. 
They cannot be separated if the two parameters, 
21,  in the convex combinations: 
































































are both between 0 and 1. 
Given the optimal inflation rates, (7) to (10), and 
output levels, (15) to (18), the solutions for 21,  in 
(19) are: 
 























Plainly, in general, the possibility to classify the 
government depends upon the initial level of output, 
0y .5 Figure 2 thus represents those two solutions (20) 
and (21) as a function of 0y . 
 
Figure 2 – The influence of initial output level 
                                                            
4 Note that  
















5 When   , both 21,  are equal to zero, meaning 




















In order to have 11   in (20), – point C in figure 2 – 
the initial level of output must be: 








0y , (22) 
whereas, in order to have 12   in (21), – point B in 
figure 2 – the initial level of output must be: 








0y . (23) 
As 0y  given by (22) is higher than 0y  given by (23),6 
this means that for  








0y , (24) 








0y  (25) 
guarantees that both 21,  are positive. See point A 
in figure 2. After noticing that 0y  given by (22) is 
higher than 0y  given by (25), 7  it is possible to 
consider an initial condition 








0y , (26) 
such that it is impossible to associate all the observed 
behaviours to the correct type of government. In all 
the other cases, the classification task can be resolved 
by the perceptron. 
Notwithstanding that conditionally, there is a 
fundamental exception. When output does not show 
any persistence over time, i.e. 0 , which is, 
indeed, the most considered case in the literature, it is 
possible to show that a straight line with intercept 
between  22   and 

 22   and 
slope equal to  1  will always divide the space 
                                                            
6 Note that 
   
 
   
























7 Note that 























in a correct way, this being eventually the result of the 
perceptron classification.8 
Plainly, in practical terms, given that a learning 
process takes place, from the training of the 
perceptron does not usually result a straight line with 
the above mentioned characteristics. Most 
importantly, given that the two straight lines 
connecting the two pairs of points in the output-
inflation space are parallel, this guarantees that the 
space is linearly separable. Figure 3 shows this 
situation. 
 
Figure 3 – A particular(ly interesting) case 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper explores a crucial aspect in the issues of 
political business cycles by considering the effects of 
boundedly rational voters, a fact that has been largely 
ignored by the literature (Caleiro, 2013). The 
classification task performed by that kind of voters is 
done by the use a perceptron in a model allowing for 
output persistence. It is shown that when output does 
not persist the classification task can always be 
resolved. Conversely, the resolution of the 
classification task, when output persists over time, 
depends crucially on the initial conditions. 
As a direction for future improvements we would like 
to explore the possible dynamics of convergence for 
output in order to check, in the long-run, the real 
importance of the initial level of output. As, indeed, 
the steady state cycle, for each kind of government are 
characterised by a level of output below the one 
identified by (26), hypothetically the resolution of the 
classification task may become more probable over 
time. 
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